About a year later, Wirecard collapsed.
In early 2019, the Financial Times reported suspected fraud at the payments company, citing internal documents from its Singapore office.
Germany’s financial regulator, BaFin, responded by banning short-selling of Wirecard shares.
It later filed a criminal complaint that named two Financial Times journalists.
Wirecard became insolvent in June 2020 after revealing that €1.9 billion reported on its balance sheet could not be found.
Prosecutors later dropped the case against the journalists, describing their reporting as fundamentally accurate.
This dynamic is not limited to regulators or corporate scandals.
It appears in ordinary organizations whenever bad news must travel through the people it implicates.
The messenger becomes the problem.
People question their motives before they examine the evidence.
People scrutinize their tone before addressing the risk.
That is why organizations need an independent route for uncomfortable information, such as direct access to an audit committee or a protected reporting channel.
A system should not depend on exceptional courage to reveal an ordinary risk.
Judge a reporting line by what happens to the first person who uses it.
Does your organization investigate difficult evidence, or the person who brings it forward?
