InsightsFinance & Performance

The most measured company in retail banking nearly destroyed itself by hitting its targets.

By Uttam Dinodia1 min readView this post on LinkedIn

For fourteen years, Wells Fargo told investors that its cross-sell metric was the engine of its growth. Products per household. The number rose every quarter. Executives were paid on it.

The number was real. The accounts were not.

Between 2002 and 2016, employees opened more than two million unauthorised deposit and credit card accounts. The SEC later fined Wells Fargo three billion dollars. Five thousand three hundred employees were dismissed. The CEO resigned.

The cross-sell KPI did exactly what it was designed to do. It rose. It just stopped meaning what it was supposed to mean.

Jack Rockart predicted this in 1979.

In Chief Executives Define Their Own Data Needs (Harvard Business Review), Rockart argued that every business has only 4 to 7 Critical Success Factors. The rest is noise. KPIs exist to measure those CSFs, not the other way around.

Many organisations have it backwards. They start with the metrics that are easy to measure and call the result strategy.

Charles Goodhart had already named the failure mode in 1975. Marilyn Strathern later sharpened it.

When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.

Wells Fargo had a target. It did not have a CSF.

The honest test of any KPI is to ask what happens if it is perfectly maximised. If the company is healthier, the metric is a CSF dressed as a KPI. If the company is hollowed out, the metric is a target with a number on it.

The dashboard does not know the difference.

Uttam Dinodia

Uttam Dinodia

Pharmaceutical Business Consultant & Executive Director, A One Afro Limited

Over 22 years in pharmaceutical supply. Helps international manufacturers and Zambian institutions with public tenders, ZAMRA regulatory pathways and distribution.