The courts had to step in.
The Crown Jewel Defence emerged in the early 1980s. The logic was simple. When a hostile bidder targets your company, sell or option your most valuable assets to a friendly party. Make the target unattractive. The bidder walks.
Revlon tried it in 1985.
Ronald Perelman's Pantry Pride launched a hostile tender offer. Revlon's board granted Forstmann Little a lock-up option on two health-care divisions at a discount.
The Delaware Supreme Court struck it down in 1986.
That ruling created what corporate law now calls the Revlon doctrine. Once the sale of a company is inevitable, the board's role shifts from defending it. It becomes an auction for the highest price.
A defence built to protect shareholders had been used against them.
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003) studied 1,500 firms across the 1990s. Companies with the heaviest anti-takeover provisions trailed those with the strongest shareholder rights by 8.5% per year. Lower profits. Lower growth. Lower firm value.
Defences that look like prudence often turn out to be entrenchment.
The real question for any board considering Crown Jewel is not whether it will deter the bidder.
It is whether the people designing the defence are the same people the bidder is trying to remove.
If yes, the defence is not a strategy. It is a job description.
